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      ruth to tell, I am more than a little bothered and bewildered by the di-
rection taken in a considerable portion of the papers submitted to the con-
ference and in the deliberations that ensued. 
Why bewildered? The problem may be semantic, but when I was invit-
ed to participate in a conference on “cyber war,” I fully expected—as a 
layperson in the cyber sphere of activities—to encounter difficulties in de-
coding a specialized experts’ jargon with which I am not closely acquainted. 
Indeed, when the first speaker mentioned clouds, I thought that he was 
talking about inclement weather. When another participant talked about 
malware, it sounded to me like a reference to a breach of the dress code. 
What really surprised me, however, was that so many participants—while 
displaying the most intimate familiarity with the “cyber” vocabulary—were 
apparently stymied by the concept of “war.” 
I should have thought that, for the military at least, the expression, 
“war,” is largely a no-brainer. Should it not have been self-evident to every 
person present that war postulates an armed conflict? Yet, panelist after 
panelist—even among those associated with United States Cyber Com-
                                                                                                                      













mand—addressed issues that pertain in a generic manner to illicit cyber 
operations (of heterogeneous characterizations and motivations) having no 
apparent linkage to an ongoing or prospective war. 
This bothers me. Having been twice the victim of “phishing” expedi-
tions into my e-mail account, I am acutely interested in what can be done 
to stop peacetime intrusions into somebody else’s private cyber domain. I 
am fascinated by the entire range of problems extending from “hacking” to 
grand-scale theft of intellectual property in peacetime. Nevertheless, surely, 
this is not why this conference was convened at the Naval War College. 
Our remit was “cyber war,” and this is what ought to have attracted our 
attention—to the exclusion of any diversionary items on anybody’s pet 
agenda. 
As an illustration of the disorientation stoked by the departure from 
the straight–and–narrow meaning of “cyber war,” let me point at the rather 
prolonged verbal give–and–take that went on in connection with the theme 
of sovereignty. I freely concede that sovereignty is a topic that ought to be 
of interest to anyone interested in international law. I have myself written 
about it,1 and I find the evolution of this centuries-old precept to be of 
compelling import. All the same, I do not propose to go into the intricacies 
of the matter. I would have liked to critique at length some of the peculiar 
notions of sovereignty advanced in this conference. I shall not succumb to 
the temptation for the plain reason that the subject is largely irrelevant to 
cyber warfare. 
It must be acknowledged that the sovereignty of enemy countries in 
wartime is trampled underfoot without the slightest hesitation. Thus, when 
the United States launched its devastating “shock and awe” attack on 
Baghdad in 1991, did anyone in the Department of Defense spend even 
five seconds mulling over Iraqi sovereignty? The question is rhetorical. 
And, if enemy sovereignty can be totally ignored in kinetic warfare, why 
should it be of greater weight when cyber warfare comes into the picture? 
There is one salient case in which sovereignty in wartime retains its full 
vigor, and that is neutrality: the sovereignty of neutral States must be fully 
deferred to by all belligerent parties. But that is a side issue when compared 
to the mortal blows that the antagonists deal to each other. 
What the conference ought to have concentrated on is how cyber op-
erations bring about or are prosecuted in war. This was properly done by a 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See Yoram Dinstein, Sovereignty, the Security Council and the Use of Force, in 
REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 111, 111–22 












number of lecturers. I shall devote my remarks to the highlights of their 
presentations, adding a few points of my own. 
In the framework of war, cyber operations invite analysis from the re-
spective standpoints of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. 
 
II. THE JUS AD BELLUM 
 
As far as the jus ad bellum is concerned, the cardinal question is not (as sug-
gested repeatedly) whether a cyber operation rises to the level of use of 
force, but whether it reaches the threshold of an armed attack. The use of 
inter-State force is strictly forbidden in Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter,2 as well as in customary international law.3 But, unless that use of 
force qualifies as an armed attack—pursuant to Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter4 and customary international law,5 which lay the ground 
for the exercise of the right of self-defense—the response of the target 
State is necessarily limited in scope. As long as the use of force does not 
amount to an armed attack, the target State can bring the matter before the 
Security Council, it can employ non-forcible countermeasures or it can sue 
(assuming that some international court or tribunal is vested with jurisdic-
tion). But it cannot use counterforce in self-defense. 
There is a vital fork in the road facing the State that has fallen victim to 
an unlawful use of force. In the musical Guys and Dolls, the famous lyrics 
are: “Sue me, sue me / Shoot bullets through me.” Still, as anyone who is 
not in the musical business will readily perceive, there is a critical 
discrepancy between the options of “Sue me, sue me” and “Shoot bullets 
through me.” Consistent with Article 51, shooting bullets (as distinct from 
reliance on litigation), in response to the use of force, is permissible only 
when an armed attack occurs. I do not want to go into the thorny issue of 
anticipatory self-defense. Suffice it to say that I do not subscribe to the 
notion that anticipatory self-defense (preceding an expected armed attack) 
is compatible with Article 51. At the same time, I propound the legality of 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, reprinted in 9 INTERNATIONAL LEG-
ISLATION: A COLLECTION OF THE TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE INTERNATIONAL INSTRU-
MENTS OF GENERAL INTEREST 327, 332 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1950). 
 3. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 99–100 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
 4. Charter of the United Nations, supra note 2, at 346. 













interceptive self-defense in reaction to an embryonic armed attack which 
has already commenced.6 
A query posed by multiple interlocutors—from the dais as much as 
from the floor—is whether there exists a gap between Article 2(4) (use of 
force) and Article 51 (armed attack). My answer is definitely affirmative. I 
put it to you that it would defy logic to maintain that, in one of the most 
carefully crafted instruments in the history of international law (the Charter 
of the United Nations, serving as a semi-constitution of the contemporary 
international community), the framers resorted to divergent phraseology—
“use of force,” on the one hand, and “armed attack,” on the other—to de-
scribe exactly the same phenomenon. 
As we have been given to understand, the United States government 
apparently does not recognize the gap between Article 2(4) and Article 51. 
But, if so, this would be no more than a knee-jerk reaction to the fact that 
the gap was overemphasized in the Nicaragua judgment of 19867 (which the 
United States has many justifiable grounds to resent). I do not deny that in 
Nicaragua the International Court of Justice went too far in its assessment 
of the dimensions of the gap. Preeminently, the Court did not view “a 
mere frontier incident” as an armed attack.8 I find this to be an untenable 
position. It was carried to its illogical conclusion by the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission’s incongruous holding of 2005, whereby border clash-
es between infantry units, even when leading to bloodshed, do not make 
the grade of an armed attack.9 
In my opinion, the gap between Article 2(4) and Article 51—while 
there—must be seen in its right proportions. What the gap denotes is that a 
use of force not involving loss of life or significant destruction of property 
falls short of an armed attack.10 If a soldier of State A shoots across the 
border of State B, killing a cow, this is an instance of use of force. But, ab-
sent a minimal degree of gravity, the act (albeit unlawful) does not rank as 
an armed attack. An armed attack must leave behind a trail of human casu-
alties or ample destruction of property. Only when that happens is it justi-
                                                                                                                      
 6. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 203–5 (5th ed. 
2011). 
 7. See Nicaragua, supra note 3, at 101, 110. 
 8. Id. at 103. 
 9. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Jus ad Bellum (Ethiopia’s 
Claims 1-8), 2005, 45 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 430, 433 (2006). 












fied to have recourse to counterforce while invoking the right of self-
defense (as per Article 51). 
There is a certain reluctance to admit that cyber attacks—no less than 
kinetic attacks—may be categorized as armed attacks under Article 51. I 
cannot explain this attitude. Laypeople may be misguided by the invisibility 
of the electrons set in motion by a cyber attack. Contrarily, cyber experts 
may be so captivated by the act of tampering with the integrity of the target 
computer that they lose sight of the external lethal/destructive effects of 
the attack. This would be parallel to artillerists concerned with the design 
of armor-piercing shells who do not ponder what havoc would happen 
once the projectiles have penetrated their targets. 
In essence, cyber (as has been stressed in sundry presentations) must be 
looked upon as a new means of warfare—in other words, a weapon: no 
less and no more than other weapons. As with all known weapons, the test 
of a new weapon is not how intimidating it looks—or how ingeniously the 
novel mechanism works—but what harm it is liable to produce. 
In its 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the International Court of Justice underscored that Article 51 does 
not refer to any specific weapon: the provision applies to (and permits self-
defense in response to) all armed attacks, regardless of the weapon em-
ployed in pressing the attack.11 
The same legal scrutiny should take place when the yardsticks are those 
of customary international law. The legal principles of the customary jus ad 
bellum remain intact whether the armed attack is kinetic or cyber. Self-
defense in response to cyber armed attacks can take place under customary 
international law, as much as under Article 51. It is immaterial that, as yet, 
no explicit State practice has crystallized concerning the exercise of the 
right of self-defense against cyber armed attacks.12 There is no need for 
State practice to develop separately as regards every concrete weapon em-
ployed in an armed attack. 
It should be added that, when exercised against a cyber armed attack, 
self-defense need not be circumscribed to “cyber-on-cyber” warfare. Once 
a State is at war (in light of the jus ad bellum), it can use all the military assets 
available to it (within the limits of the jus in bello), whether they are kinetic 
or cyber. 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 244 (July 8). 
 12. See Marco Roscini, World Wide Warfare—Jus ad Bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, 14 













Already in 1999, at a previous Naval War College conference on com-
puter network attacks (as they were then called), I observed that these at-
tacks can cause fatalities through gaining control of target computers, caus-
ing a shutdown of computer–controlled life–support systems, deadly 
aircraft crashes, ruinous floods (by opening the sluices of high dams) and 
even the doomsday scenario of the meltdown of a nuclear reactor.13 A lot 
has transpired since 1999. What looked at the end of the twentieth century 





No doubt, the attribution of a cyber attack to its real source may be fraught 
with difficulties. But is this a unique feature of cyber war? In actuality, at-
tribution is often challenging even in circumstances of kinetic warfare, es-
pecially at sea. Reference has been made to the famous Corfu Channel case 
of 1949.14 Well, what were the facts there? In 1946, two British destroyers 
struck mines laid in Albanian territorial waters, which are part of the Corfu 
Channel, an international strait between the Greek island of Corfu and the 
Albanian coast. The explosions caused heavy damage to the destroyers and 
dozens of casualties among the British sailors. Albania lost the case on the 
ground that it must have known of the existence of the minefield, and that 
it should have warned the approaching British warships of the imminent 
danger within its territorial waters.15 Yet, interestingly, the International 
Court of Justice did not find sufficient evidence to establish who exactly 
had laid the mines (although the spoor led to the door of neighboring Yu-
goslavia), and pronounced that the origin of the mines remained a matter 
of conjecture.16 
It may be added that in 1937—at the time of the Spanish Civil War—
an arrangement was concluded in Nyon “against piratical acts by subma-
rines,” perpetrated in the Mediterranean by unknown submarines and re-
sulting in the sinking of merchant ships not belonging to the opposing par-
ties.17 This was an exceptional instrument, which treated activities by 
                                                                                                                      
 13. Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, in COMPUTER NETWORK 
ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 105 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell 
eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
 14. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 9). 
 15. Id. at 22–23. 
 16. Id. at 16–17. 












submarines—i.e., government warships—as piratical, although as a rule 
piracy is restricted to acts committed by private persons for private ends.18 
The rationale underlying the Nyon Arrangement was that the submarines 
in question (suspected to be either German or Italian) could not be identi-
fied, and no State assumed responsibility for their depredations.19 
I do not underrate the imperative need of tracing back a cyber (or a ki-
netic) attack to its source. It would be reckless (and senseless) to strike back 
hastily at the ostensible fount of a cyber attack, for the target State (State B) 
may be lashing out at an innocent party (State C) in lieu of the culpable actor 
(State A). However, as we were informed by the Cyber Command experts, 
tracing back the originator of a cyber attack is normally feasible: the catch is 
that it is time-consuming. 
I fail to see the great peril posed by a delay in identifying the State re-
sponsible for a cyber attack. After all, if the unattributed cyber attack is an 
isolated event (not followed by any other attack), there is no inexorable 
rush to figure out instantaneously who is really behind it. Conversely, if the 
cyber attack is only the precursor of a stream of other attacks in its wake, 
source verification is likely to become much easier and faster. 
Does the fact that a cyber attack is mounted without disclosure of iden-
tity instigate an ethical issue (as has been suggested)? I do not see why there 
is anything intrinsically wrong (at least legally) in an attacker not showing 
his hand overtly. In kinetic warfare, a sniper does not disclose his identity 
or whereabouts. Why should a cyber attacker behave differently? 
Patently, the legal dissection undergoes a radical transformation if the 
cyber attacker does not only strike anonymously but is masquerading be-
hind a specific false front (from which the cyber attack appears to have 
emanated). It then depends on the character of that fraudulent front. If it 
is, say, a hospital or a school, the deceitful conduct is no different from the 
behavior of a kinetic attacker hiding behind or among civilian “human 
shields.”20 The jus in bello strictly forbids the use of “human shields” as a 
method of warfare.21 
                                                                                                                      
 18. See the definition of piracy in Article 101 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 19. L.F.E. Goldie, Terrorism, Piracy and the Nyon Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT 
A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 225, 240–44 (Yoram 
Dinstein ed., 1989). 
 20. On “human shields,” see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UN-
DER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 152–55 (2d ed. 2010). 
 21. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 













IV. THE JUS IN BELLO 
 
Assuming that war is already raging (whether its onset was a cyber or a ki-
netic armed attack), the jus in bello—a.k.a. the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) or international humanitarian law—automatically applies. We have 
been told over and over of the need to apply LOAC to cyber warfare “by 
analogy.” But, to my mind, there is no room in this context for an analogy, 
which by its nature is based on conceptual similarity and correspondence. 
There is nothing extraordinary in cyber warfare: it is just ordinary warfare 
with a little bit of extra. Cyber warfare does not merely resemble other 
forms of warfare: it is warfare. As such, it is directly governed by the jus in 
bello. 
Concerns have been raised about the clarity of the LOAC lex lata. I find 
these concerns both exaggerated and unreal: 
 
(i) These concerns are exaggerated, because (as shown by Herbert Hart) 
every legal rule includes a nucleus of clarity surrounded by a penumbra 
of uncertainty, the meaning of which may prove doubtful in certain 
circumstances.22 Several panelists dwelt upon the penumbra of LOAC 
rules. However, the nucleus of the rules is equally there. 
(ii) Scholarly doubts about the state of the lex lata are unreal, since they are 
not shared by the end users of LOAC. The armed forces of States con-
stantly reiterate LOAC rules in their military manuals, applying and en-
forcing them quite rigorously. There is also a modicum of international 
enforcement today. The Yugoslav Tribunal (the ICTY) has already 
come up with extensive jurisprudence, which shows that LOAC is alive 
and kicking as a robust legal system.23 
 
In keeping with LOAC, cyber operations do not automatically come 
within the ambit of the definition of “attacks,” which are defined as “acts 
of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”24 The 
condition of violence is sine qua non. Unlike an armed attack under the jus ad 
                                                                                                                      
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF 
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 711, 736 (Dietrich Schindler & 
Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 22. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 11–12 (1965). 
 23. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal 
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). 












bellum, a jus in bello attack would embrace my previous bovine example: if a 
cow is killed by enemy fire, that is an attack under LOAC. All that is neces-
sary is death/injury to human beings or more than nominal damage to 
property. The same acid test is applied to all types of warfare, whether ki-
netic or cyber. If the consequences of a cyber operation are human 
death/injury or tangible property damage, it constitutes an attack compati-
ble with LOAC requirements.25 
Accordingly, a cyber operation does not pass muster as an “attack” if it 
is limited to (i) intelligence gathering (through collection of data and infor-
mation); (ii) disruption of communications; or (iii) issuing false orders to 
enemy forces. I therefore fail to see why the mere planting of a “worm” in 
an enemy computer (without destroying it) is tantamount to an attack. 
As for intelligence gathering, it must be appreciated that espionage per 
se is not prohibited by LOAC, although the individual spy (engaging in this 
activity behind enemy lines and out of uniform) may be punished by the 
enemy if he falls into its hands during such an engagement.26 
Under the fundamental principle of distinction, attacks—whether cyber 
or kinetic—must be confined to lawful targets, to wit, combatants, civilians 
directly participating in hostilities or military objectives. What does this 
mean in concrete cyber terms? 
First and foremost, direct attacks against civilian computers—or other 
civilian objects—are prohibited. This is the incontestable nucleus of a basic 
rule of LOAC governing kinetic, as well as cyber, attacks. The penumbra 
relates to the definition of a civilian computer. The general definition of 
civilian objects is negative: “all objects which are not military objectives.”27 
The same proposition applies also to computers: civilian computers are 
those that are not military computers. 
Like all military objectives, military computers are defined by their “na-
ture, location, purpose or use.”28 A non-exhaustive list of military comput-
ers by nature would include (i) computers designed as components in ki-
netic weapons or weapon systems, e.g., in artillery, tanks, warships, military 
                                                                                                                      
 25. See Michael N. Schmitt, CNA and the Jus in Bello: An Introduction, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF AN INTERNATIONAL EXPERT CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACKS AND 
THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 101, 112 (Karin Byström 
ed., 2004). 
 26. On espionage, see HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND 
CONFLICT RESEARCH, HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR 
AND MISSILE WARFARE rules 118–24 (2009). 
 27. Additional Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 52(1) at 737. 













aircraft or missiles; (ii) computers designed to facilitate the logistical opera-
tion of military units; and (iii) computers designed for the production or 
supply of munitions, the development of new weapons, etc. 
Run-of-the-mill computers (to wit, those that are not military comput-
ers by nature) may become military computers by use simply due to serving 
combatants for military purposes. This broad classification encompasses 
not only computers containing sensitive operational data or classified mili-
tary information. Once computers are used in the discharge of military du-
ties—even if they are dedicated to mundane administrative tasks, such as 
innocuous and unclassified correspondence—they are military objectives. 
In case of doubt whether a computer is civilian or military, it must be 
viewed as civilian.29 But this is not as simple as it sounds. For instance, if a 
civilian uses a computer that previously served a member of the armed 
forces, the fact that the military software has been removed does not settle 
the matter inasmuch as the hardware may be contaminated; the hard drive 
of the computer may still contain unerased military data. 
Apart from direct attacks against civilian computers, LOAC interdicts 
indiscriminate attack. When a malicious destructive “virus” is planted in 
enemy military computers—absent any control over the possibility of its 
spreading unchecked to civilian computers—this will be considered an un-
lawful indiscriminate attack.30 In terms of being indiscriminate, the act of 
planting a virtual destructive virus must be deemed to be on a par with that 
of planting a lethal biological virus. 
Empirically, the crux of the issue in cyber as much as in kinetic attacks 
is proportionality in terms of collateral damage. The general rule is that 
when lawful targets are attacked, collateral damage to civilians/civilian ob-
jects must not be expected to be “excessive” in relation to the “concrete 
and direct” military advantage anticipated.31 A cyber attack may in fact 
cause less collateral damage than a kinetic attack on the same site.32 But 
even a cyber attack may trigger a host of civilian casualties and massive de-
struction to civilian objects. When will the casualties and/or destruction be 
considered “excessive”? Here the penumbra is more spacious than usual, 
                                                                                                                      
 29. Id., art. 52(3). 
 30. See Johann–Christoph Woltag, Cyber Warfare, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 988, 991 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). 
 31. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 51(5)(b) at 736. 
 32. See Herbert S. Lin, Operational Reality of Cyber Warfare, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND NEW WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES 137, 140 (Wolff Heintschel 












there being no scientific way to measure when losses and damage are “ex-
cessive” compared to the military advantage anticipated. Still, it is taken for 
granted that the attacker must behave in a reasonable manner. 
I have alluded to the need for the military advantage anticipated to be 
“concrete and direct,” that is to say, not just abstract or speculative. How-
ever, military advantage has to be looked at in a holistic fashion. When a 
large-scale attack is in progress, the outlook would be distorted if every dis-
crete segment were assessed in isolation: it is required to put in balance the 
overall campaign.33 Ergo, if a cyber attack is launched systematically against 
an entire array of enemy military computers, with dire consequences for 
civilians/civilian objects by way of collateral damage, the military advantage 
must be evaluated from a comprehensive perspective. Parsing the piece-
meal benefits accruing from strikes against particular target computers may 
not tell the story accurately. The whole may be greater than the sum of its 
parts. 
 
V. A NEW TREATY? 
 
I share the view that there is no point at the present juncture in seeking to 
initiate a new treaty promulgating a code of conduct in cyber warfare. First, 
I cannot imagine that States would be ready and willing to undertake any-
time soon the arduous process of formulating such a treaty. But, second, I 
do not think that the projected treaty (if it were to be drafted) would do 
more than enunciate the general norms of LOAC. 
Bear in mind that this is by no means the first time in the history of 
LOAC that the introduction of a new weapon has created the misleading 
impression that great legal transmutations are afoot. Let me remind you of 
what happened upon the introduction of another new weapon, viz., the 
submarine. The full potency of that weapon came to light in World War I, 
when the unrestricted U-boat offensive almost choked the Allied countries. 
In the postwar era, many voices were raised in favor of adopting a new 
general treaty coming to grips with this controversial innovation. What was 
the outcome? After two failed attempts and much soul-searching, a procès-
verbal was successfully concluded in London in 1936. Yet, all that the au-
thors of the procès-verbal managed to accomplish was proclaiming that 
“submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which sur-
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face vessels are subject” (accentuating some particulars).34 I am positive 
that, if a treaty on cyber warfare were done today, it would similarly stipu-





Let me conclude with two interlaced observations: 
 
(i) We hear all the time about the asymmetry allegedly inherent in present-
day LOAC, with the legal cards stacked in favor of the major powers at 
the expense of poor (militarily under-equipped) countries. Well, cyber 
warfare lends impoverished countries—ones possessing no aircraft car-
riers, no F-15s or 16s, and no cruise missiles—the opportunity of level-
ing the score. All that such a country needs is a few “whiz kids” who 
are capable of breaking the firewalls of the high and mighty, perhaps 
turning the tables on the latter. Inordinate computer dependency by the 
strongest nations of the world thus leads to a special vulnerability.35 
(ii) The real challenge for Cyber Command, as I see it, is to make sure that 
nobody will be able to turn the tables on the United States, and that the 
United States—the most advanced in the world, not only in aircraft 
carriers, F-15s and 16s and cruise missiles, but also in cyberspace—can 
preserve its military superiority against all actual and potential adver-
saries. I sincerely hope that Cyber Command is not mesmerized by en-
titlements to intellectual property, but instead is preparing itself—
through “war gaming”—for contingencies of real war. For, if you de-
lete “war” from the equation of “war gaming,” the only element that 
you are left with is “gaming.” I believe that Cyber Command should 
shift its gaze away from the distractions of cyber operations in peace-
time. It must focus on averting a future cyber Pearl Harbor. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 34. Procès-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare set forth in Part IV of the 
Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, 3 Bevans 298, 
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 21, at 1145, 1146. 
 35. See Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare, 42 AIR 
FORCE LAW REVIEW 173, 191–95 (1997). 
